In politics, as in game theory, actors define the game they intend to play. They choose between cooperation and confrontation. In a cooperative game, players coordinate to expand the total payoff. In a non-cooperative game, each side maximizes short-term gain; the equilibrium often becomes zero-sum—and at times negative-sum.
For those in power, cooperation is usually the rational strategy. The agenda setter controls rule design, sequencing, and expectation management. In repeated political interactions, cooperation compounds credibility and safeguards legitimacy. It builds political capital, which is essential for governing with stability and low friction. Confrontation may energize a core base, but it compresses the broader coalition.
Tareq Rahman’s visit to the house of Mr. Shafiqul and Nahid signaled a preference for coordination over confrontation. It conveyed an intention to play a cooperative game.
However, by delaying the oath as members of the ‘সংবিধান সংস্কার পরিষদ,’ and by signaling that BNP will not accept upper house PR, BNP has indicated resistance and a tilt toward a non-cooperative strategy—one that typically yields suboptimal, zero-sum, or negative-sum outcomes.
Signals matter. In repeated games, early defection erodes trust and can lock actors into a self-reinforcing cycle of conflict. Even before taking the oath, BNP appears to signal a non-cooperative stance.
I do not know who is advising BNP strategically, but this path carries costs. The authority to frame the game rests with those in office. During Professor Yunus’s term, many of us extended goodwill to BNP. I argued that containing rent-seeking behavior among BNP cadres was partly Professor Yunus’s responsibility to preserve systemic stability.
That buffer no longer exists.
BNP may assume it has little to lose. But political capital is a limited assett ; It needs to be built or it gets eroded. a political party must invest effort in its political capital. BAL didn’t make any effort to build its political capital. BAL, only concentrated on wealth accumulation at the expense of political capital during 2009-2024.
If someone like me—publicly known as a BNP sympathizer—withdraws support before the oath, BNP contracts its coalition and raises the cost of governing alone.
The strategic conclusion is clear: cooperation on upper house PR offers long-term payoff in legitimacy and coalition maintenance. Persistent confrontation narrows options and worsens outcomes for all players.
BNP is not the Awami League. It lacks comparable structural depth and enforcement capacity to sustain prolonged high-conflict politics. It does not command the instruments required to win an extended zero-sum contest. If it escalates without those tools, it risks self-inflicted erosion of legitimacy. The previous cycle cost 18 years.
People do learn from history. The real question is which lessons they choose to apply.
